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Abstract: This article aims to analyse the contours of China's energy (in)security, highlighting the case of 
electricity, coal and, in particular, oil. The central argument is that China faces a significant energy shortage, 
which it seeks to fight through, for example, the massive purchases of oil that it has been operating abroad. 
Indeed, since 1993 - when China became a net oil importer - the Chinese have been investing in a 
sophisticated 'black gold' diplomacy that enables them to acquire more and more oil to meet their energy 
needs. 
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Resumo: O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar os contornos da (in)segurança energética chinesa, 
realçando o caso da eletricidade, do carvão, e, em especial, do petróleo. O argumento central é o de que a 
China enfrenta uma considerável escassez energética, a qual procura combater por meio, por exemplo, das 
massivas aquisições de petróleo que tem vindo a realizar no estrangeiro. Com efeito, desde 1993, ano em que 
a China se converteu em um claro importador petrolífero, os chineses têm vindo a investir em uma 
sofisticada diplomacia do ‘ouro negro’ que lhes permita adquirir cada vez mais petróleo para satisfazer as 
suas necessidades energéticas. 
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Introduction 
This article aims to analyse the contours of China's energy (in)security, highlighting the case of 
electricity, coal and, in particular, oil. The central argument is that China faces a significant energy 
shortage, which it seeks to fight through, for example, the massive purchases of oil abroad. Indeed, 
since 1993 - when China became a net oil importer - the Chinese have been investing in a 
sophisticated 'black gold' diplomacy that enables them to acquire ever-growing amounts of oil so as 
to meet their energy needs. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012, § 7º), "in 2009, China 
became the world's second largest oil importer after the United States". However, in 2010, the 
Middle Kingdom has overtaken the United States, becoming “the world's largest energy consumer" 
(IEA, 2010, § 2º). The China's rise marks “a new era in the history of energy" (PENG BIN-WIN, 
2012, p. 53). Indeed, "[its growing consumption] transformed the world energy markets and pushed 
up the oil and coal prices in recent years", with possible repercussions, in the long run, towards "the 
level of energy security of the United States" (PENG BIN-WIN, 2012, p. 53). In fact, it is estimated 
that the rapid development of China will have the greatest impact on world energy markets, as 
hundreds of millions of Chinese ascend to the middle class (WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 2013). 
The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2012) predicts that China will be responsible for an 
increase of over 40% in world oil demand in 2030. The geopolitical importance and potential 
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influence of China in the world have been expanding as a result of its “vast oil investments, long-
term supply agreements, outstanding bank loans”, and a “vigorous energy diplomacy" (HERBERG, 
2011, § 5º). Therefore, China has become a "key diplomatic actor in most oil and gas exporting 
regions in the world" (HERBERG, 2011, § 5º). 
 
1. The contours of China’s energy (in) security 
The Chinese market for luxury cars shall grow at “an annual rate of 12% by 2020”, compared with 
“8% for most of the passenger car market" (MCKINSEY, 2013, p. 4). It is expected that sales of 
luxury cars in the country shall reach "three million [units] in 2020", equaling those of Western 
Europe, and overcoming "the 2.3 million [in expected] sales" for the North American market 
(MCKINSEY, 2013, p. 4). However, "China could overtake the United States as the largest market 
for luxury cars already in 2016", when estimated sales reach "2.25 million units" (MCKINSEY, 
2013, p. 4) 
Both the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2011) and the International Energy 
Agency (2011) estimate that oil imports will increase at an alarming annual average of about 
380000 barrels per day from 2009 to 2025. It is predicted that China could become the "world's 
largest oil importer (surpassing the United States) in 2020" (CLEMENT, 2011, p. 4), or perhaps 
even a little before 2020. In fact, Niu Li, renowned Chinese economist, notes that "China could 
overtake the United States as the world's largest importer of oil sooner than expected in 2015" 
(PEOPLE’S DAILY, 2013, § 2º). 
The growing sense of vulnerability to possible disruptions in foreign supply has contributed to 
Chinese leaders increasingly perceiving energy security as "a matter of national security" (THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, 2011, p. 4). In a context where China has revealed a growing appetite for oil 
from the Middle East, and other parts of the world, it should be noted that most of this will have to 
travel long distances, passing through [vulnerable] maritime bottlenecks, as well as through 
railroads, Russian and Central Asian pipelines (THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 2012). 
Within 15 years, “60-70% of China's oil needs will most probably transit through the Strait of 
Malacca", and by "sea lanes of the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia" (HERBERG and ZWEIG, 
2010, p. 8). On the other hand, one cannot exclude a possible passage through the Arctic. 
Interestingly, "China intends to be one of the first countries to exploit the natural resources of the 
Arctic and to use this sea route for commercial purposes", claiming that "the Arctic is a part of the 
global commons" (LIN, 2011, p.14). To this respect, the Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo made the 
following comment in March 2010: "The Arctic belongs to all the world's people, since no nation 
has sovereignty over it ... China should consider playing an important role in Arctic exploration as it 
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has a fifth of the world population" (Cit. by CHANG, 2010, § 1º). This claim of 'moral' right to 
resources and space seems to reflect a certain appetite for Lebensraum. 
Given the above, "the way China deals with its energy security will have major repercussions 
on the competitiveness of the global energy diplomacy in the future, as well as on the effectiveness 
of the management institutions in the oil market" (HERBERG and ZWEIG, 2010, p. 8). 
The Middle Kingdom has long been able to meet its energy needs through the use of domestic 
reserves (HURST, 2007). Until 1993, “China was a major oil exporter to the East Asian countries" 
(ROSEN and HOUSER, 2007, p. 20). However, since 1993 its domestic reserves have no longer 
been able to meet demand. Since then, China has become a "net oil importer" (EVANS and 
DOWNS, 2006, p. 2). Nevertheless, it is clear that oil production in China continues to be 
significant (PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 2010). Currently, according to the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2012, p. 3), "China is one of the world's most important producer countries of oil and 
gas". In 2010, China's oil production exceeded "4 million barrels per day (mb/d)" (IEA, 2012, p. 3). 
However, due to a strong and sustained economic growth, its demand for oil has also increased 
"from 4.6 mb/d in 2000, to more than 8 mb/d in 2009" (IEA, 2012, p. 3). Moreover, "China has 20.4 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of January 2012, i.e. over 4 billion barrels more than three 
years ago, the highest in the Asia-Pacific region" (U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, 2012, § 4º). The largest and oldest Chinese oilfields are located in the 
northeastern region of the country. The Middle Kingdom produced about “4.3 million oil barrels per 
day in 2011" (U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2012, § 4º). The 
International Energy Agency (2011, § 6º) predicts "stabilization, in the long-term, reaching 4.7 
million barrels per day in 2035". 
The increase in population, as well as of “the standard of living of citizens", and of "the levels 
of industrialization of a country" produces an "increased energy consumption" (DEMIR, 2010, 
p.522). In the case of China, it is unquestionable that there has been both a tremendous growth in 
terms of population, as well as in terms of the standard of living of its citizens over the past 
decades, which translates therefore in a "greater need for oil" (HARDY ZHU, 2012). In the coming 
years, energy demand is likely to grow, especially in southern and eastern areas of China, poor in 
energy resources, but where the economy is vibrant (LIN, 2012). By 2020, oil demand in China 
could reach "12.2 million barrels per day" (INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 2012, p. 3). 
In order to meet the energy needs of the Middle Kingdom, "China's diplomacy has been 
working actively since the mid-90s, in order to improve its relations with the major oil exporting 
countries, to ensure a safe access to energy sources abroad, [...] investing in infrastructure projects" 
(CAUSEVIC, 2012, p. 1). In the attempt to find business partners, the Middle Kingdom has been 
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importing large quantities of oil from Saudi Arabia, "about 1.1 million barrels per day in 2012" 
(AL-TAMINI, 2013, § 9º). According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012, p. 8) 
"the Middle East remains the largest oil supplier to China, although African countries, particularly 
Angola, have come to occupy an increasingly important place in the context of China's oil imports 
in recent years". In 2011, "the Middle East provided 2.6 million barrels per day (51%)", with 
emphasis on "(from) other regions that export to China (stand out) Africa represents (with) 1.2 
million barrels per day (24%), the Asia-Pacific region (with) 173 000 barrels per day (3%), and 1.1 
million barrels per day (22 %) coming from other countries" (ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, 2012, § 8º). In turn, states like Iran, Oman, Yemen, Sudan, Congo, Russia 
and Kazakhstan are also worthy of attention, (among other) as China´s trading partners (of China, 
regarding) in oil supply. In 2011, “the Chinese state oil companies operated in over 30 countries, 
making acquisitions of oil assets (oil extraction from deposits that [China] had acquired) in at least 
20 countries" (LEE, 2012, p. 84). 2010 data show that 23% of offshore Chinese oil-equity activity 
occurred (was conducted) in Kazakhstan, 15% in Sudan and Venezuela, 14% in Angola, 5% in 
Syria, 4% in Russia, and 3% in Tunisia (JIANG & SINTON, 2011). In turn, Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Peru, Ecuador, Oman, Colombia, Canada, Yemen, Cameroon, Gabon, Iraq, Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan make up the remaining 20 percent (JIANG & SINTON, 2011). 
Like many other countries which import energy resources, “China does not have an overall 
strategy for energy security" (HOWELL, 2009, p. 191). There is, instead, "a centralised policy" that 
sometimes leads to "competing interest groups, exaggerated rhetoric and initiatives at the provincial 
level" (HOWELL, 2009, p. 191). Moreover, China pursues a "strategy of petroleum assets" which 
besides" not providing energy security" even aggravates instability" (GILGUM, 2009, p. 12). In 
fact, "the strategic choice currently employed by policy makers is unsustainable, given the sharp 
increase in demand for oil from China in the future" (GILGUM, 2009, p. 12). Beijing must realise 
that "it cannot operate effectively outside the global energy market" and that "the diplomatic and 
multilateral cooperation is essential to the future of energy security" (GILGUM, 2009, p. 12). 
There are several government agencies in China that oversee energy policies. However, these 
agencies are not integrated or hierarchised in terms of political power and have overlapping areas of 
authority, which has led to intense rivalry and inefficient management (BEST & LEVINA, 2012). 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is "the main body in charge of policy 
making and the regulatory authority of the energy sector", while "the other four ministries oversee 
various components of the country's oil policy" (BEST & LEVINA, 2012, p. 16). The government 
created the "National Energy Administration (NEA)", in July 2008, aiming to operate as "the 
energy regulator par excellence" (ASIA TRADE HUB, 2013, § 1º). The NEA, together with the 
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NDRC, "is responsible for approving new energy projects in China, establishing domestic energy 
prices, and implementing the energy policies of the central Government, among other functions" 
(ASIA TRADE HUB, 2013, § 1º). The NDRC is "a department of the State Council of China, the 
highest organ of executive power in the country" (ASIA TRADE HUB, 2013, § 1º). In January 
2010, the government created a "National Energy Commission", aiming to "consolidate the energy 
policy among the various agencies of the State Council" (U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION 
ADMINISTRATION, 2012, p. 3). 
The situation has not undergone substantial changes since Andrews-Speed (2004, p. 56) 
wrote, in 2004, about the "chronically fragmented nature of the Chinese energy policy" resulting 
from the "continuous power of state energy companies" combined with "the lack of a robust and 
well - equipped agency, in charge of the formulation of energy policy". In the absence of a powerful 
and influential Ministry of Energy, “the Chinese energy policy is actually more disaggregated than 
that of many other countries" (HOWELL, 2009, p. 191).  
It should be emphasised that "China has created its first Ministry of Energy, in 1988, from 
what remained of the old agencies of electricity, coal and oil, but dissolved it in 1993, since the 
regulator failed to control the powerful state-owned enterprises that dominate the sector" 
(REUTEURS, 2012, § 20º). Currently, there is a recognised sense of urgency on the part of industry 
groups, as well as other Chinese economic and social sectors, in creating a comprehensive 
"Ministry of Energy, capable of taking control of the energy industry of the country, which is 
currently managed by various government departments" (CHINA DAILY, 2012, §18º). Although 
China Energy Society states that "the potential of power distribution between all these bodies may 
be complex", it admits, however, that "the creation of a new super-ministry" is not only possible, 
but, effectively, an urgent need" (CHINA DAILY, 2012, § 1º). 
Oil is considered a fundamental strategic asset (due to its importance) for China's economic 
development, but at the moment is proving to be the element par excellence of the Middle 
Kingdom´s present structural energy insecurity (CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2013). Beijing 
demonstrates concern about the fact that its domestic production of oil and gas have stalled, and 
“initiatives to explore non-conventional energy reserves, such as shale gas in western region of the 
country, and deep-water reserves in the South China Sea also remain underdeveloped" (THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, 2012, § 19º). 
The first factor that contributes to Chinese oil insecurity is therefore the dependence - 
"currently, more than 50 percent" - of China on foreign oil, which will increase to "60-70 percent in 
2015" (LEE, 2012, p.76). At the rate of current production and exploration, Chinese oil reserves 
will last only about 10 years (BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY, 2012). Based 
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on a historical analysis of oil consumption in China, from 1980 to 2008, "the annual growth rate of 
oil consumption in the country was 2.75% during the period 1980-1990, which increased to 6.93 % 
during the period 1990-2000, reaching, after 7.04%, from 2000 to 2008" (HAIBO WANG, 2010, p. 
2). This means that China is too far from the era of self-sufficiency in oil, (from which) it (had) 
enjoyed since the mid-60s, depending currently on increasingly imported oil (ZHIDONG LI et al, 
2005, p. 2). 
There are some long-term trends in the Middle Kingdom, which give the world the assurance 
that it will continue to import more and more oil. One concerns the rapid urbanisation, which 
requires higher power consumption (O'NEILL et al, 2012). At the current rate, the urbanisation in 
China will tend to reach a level in the range of "55% to 60% between 2015 and 2020", and by 2030 
Michael J. Silverstein estimates that "there will be approximately 270 million more urban dwellers 
in the country" (J.P. MORGAN, 2013, p. 6). However this data is important with regard to China's 
energy (in) security, since, as indicated by The Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040 (2013, p. 4), "an 
urban resident consumes more energy than a rural inhabitant" and, on the other hand, "urban 
dwellers tend to have an easier access to more modern and efficient fuel". In practice, the growth of 
this city population requires increased energy consumption, particularly in the transport sector 
which will lead to China importing more oil (ROLAND BERGER STRATEGY CONSULTANTS, 
2011). 
Another factor linked to the Chinese oil insecurity, and that tells the world that the country 
will continue to depend increasingly on foreign oil, concerns the fact that China has "entered a 
period of rapid development of urbanization and heavy industrialization" (XIAOXI LI & 
JIANCHENG PAN, 2011, p. 308). The Middle Kingdom produces vast quantities of steel, 
aluminum and concrete, which require substantial energy consumption. This is further compounded 
by the fact that Chinese factories are not energy efficient. In fact, China needs "20 percent more 
energy to produce steel than the international average, or 45 percent more energy to produce 
concrete", and "the aluminum industry consumes as much energy as the entire commercial sector" – 
that is, "hotels, restaurants, banks and shopping centers" (FACTS & DETAILS, 2012, § 45º). 
Another trend related to Chinese oil insecurity, and that points to a greater dependence on 
foreign oil, concerns the emergence of a middle class in China - estimated at "more than 300 
million people" and "that now exceeds the entire population of the United States" (CNN Money, 
2012, p. 8) – which starts opting for air transport, while simultaneously fascinated by cars (THE 
GUARDIAN, 2012). Indeed, the number of plane users in China more than tripled from 27.3 
million in 1990 to 83.7 million in 2002, and, during the same period, the number of car users in the 
country increased more than 12 fold, from 198,000 to 2.42 million (ECONOMIST 
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INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 2013). Moreover, it is estimated that "in 2030, the number of drivers in 
China will reach 440 million people, 400 million of which will be drivers of passenger vehicles" 
(LINWEI MA, et al, 2012, p. 4). In turn, the APEC ENERGY DEMAND & SUPPLY OUTLOOK 
(2013. p. 42) indicates that, in 2035, there will be "343 vehicles per 1000 people, as opposed to 58 
per 1000 people in 2010".  
Consequently, it is predicted that energy demand relating to the transport sector in China, 
around 2035, will be about "two and a half times that recorded in 2010" (APEC ENERGY 
DEMAND & SUPPLY OUTLOOK, 2013, p. 42). Such an increase will be fueled by two key 
factors. On the one hand, "economic growth will continue to be fast, with an estimated increase in 
real GDP per capita equivalent to the purchasing power of about $ 32,400 in 2035" (APEC 
ENERGY DEMAND & SUPPLY OUTLOOK, 2013, p. 42). The high growth of the economy will 
result in the "rapid increase of vehicles per inhabitant", which will be "particularly evident during 
the period 2010-2020" (APEC ENERGY DEMAND & SUPPLY OUTLOOK, 2013, p. 42). It 
should be considered that while oil is susceptible of potentially replacing coal, nuclear and 
hydroelectric power, no other primary source can, however, replace oil at a reasonable economic 
cost, as explained by Michael Kumhof and Dirk Muir, "substitutes suitable for oil, at the necessary 
scale and horizons, simply do not exist" (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND WORKING 
PAPER, 2012, p. 4). 
Given the trends listed above, it is therefore clear that China unquestionably needs oil. 
However, as explained due to the reduction of its domestic oil reserves, and therefore the high 
dependence on foreign oil, it is understandable that China's oil security is at stake (CÁCERES, 
PEACE & CONFLICT MONITOR, 2013). According to a Report by China 's Energy Development 
Strategy and Policy, there is oil insecurity when "the sudden interruption of oil supplies, oil 
shortages, or rising prices, causes damage in an economy, to a degree that is determined by its 
dependence with regard to foreign oil, the scale of the fluctuations in oil prices, and its 
responsiveness (which includes, for example, strategic oil reserves, alternative energy sources, and 
a system of early warning)" (REVIEW OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2004, p. 12). 
If, on the one hand, domestic Chinese oil reserves are insufficient to meet the energy needs of 
the country (being a source, therefore, of energy insecurity), the availability of foreign oil to China 
and the reliability of oil supplies to the country threaten its oil security. Indeed, being undeniable 
that China has developed dependence on foreign oil - it is estimated that "in 2015 Chinese oil 
imports [shall] stand at around 320 million tons, an increase of 41% compared to 2010" – Beijing´s 
first concern shall be to make sure that there is enough oil abroad to meet the energy needs of the 
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country (HAIBO WANG, 2010). After all, "China's energy security can be defined as the attempt to 
ensure the reliability of the external supplies of oil at stable prices" (LEE, 2012, p. 77). 
Since China became an oil importer, in 1993, its leaders have considered the development of 
relations with oil producers in the Middle East as a diplomatic priority (BLUMENTHAL, 2005). 
Although there is enough oil abroad to meet the Chinese energy demand in the coming years, one 
has, however, to acknowledge that "most Chinese oil imports come mainly from politically unstable 
regions" (ZHONGXIANG ZHANG, 2012, p. 329). One might question the effectiveness of this 
option (i.e., to resort to these unstable producers), however, it is essential to have in mind that the 
fact that China has entered late in the international oil market, had already won a first-mover control 
over the best existing oilfields, leaving Beijing with little choice beyond the establishment of 
agreements with the so-called rogue states (ZHONGXIANG ZHANG, 2007, 2010). This explains 
why "the Chinese state oil companies are so committed to acquire assets in West Africa, Latin 
America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia” (HERBERG, Testimony before the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012, § 5º). However, "under the expansion of its 
activities abroad, the Chinese state oil companies overestimate the probability of a possible 
disruption of oil supplies" (ZHONGXIANG ZHANG, 2012, p. 339).  
This explains why it is therefore important to consider the question of the reliability of the oil 
supply from its source of origin. Reliability is defined as “the level of exposure to various risks to 
which China´s energy supply are subject” (SHAOFENG, 2011, p. 616). It may happen that oil 
imports are at risk of being refused or discontinued as a result of a hostile bilateral relationship, or 
instability in the supplying countries, due to war, social unrest, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, among 
others (IEA, 2011). That said, "countries like Sudan, Angola, Nigeria and Myanmar have all been 
buffeted by internal conflicts, and states like Ecuador and Venezuela have strained relations with 
neighboring countries" (SHAOFENG, 2011, p. 617). The major international oil companies are 
often "subject to repeated incidents of kidnapping and murder of their workers in local oil fields" 
(SHAOFENG, 2011, p. 617). In China's case, the question of the reliability of its oil supply is 
therefore urgent, since this type of countries undergoing major social and political instability, have 
sometimes seen attacks on oilfields and Chinese workers (murdered or kidnapped), as is the case of 
Sudan or Ethiopia (CHINA DAILY, 2007). 
 
2. The cyclical dimension of China's energy insecurity 
China has been battered by frequent interruptions in electricity supply, extremely damaging to the 
economy, since 2002 (BOYD, 2012). Hence, the Chinese power grid failures have raised fears 
about a 'domestic electrical insecurity' (ZHA DAOJIONG, 2006). In fact, "for every summer in the 
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last decade, the most industrialized provinces of China were subject to interruptions in electricity 
supply" (ROBERT, 2011, § 1º). Thousands of factories and companies, located in economically 
developed areas, are forced to suspend their activity at times of peak production (ASIA PACIFIC 
NEWS, 2011). For example, in the province of Zhejiang - the regional economy that most grows in 
China - more than half of private businesses were without electricity in the first half of 2004 (the 
year in which the country suffered "the worst power cuts since the beginning of 90s"), about 11 
days per month, on average (XINHUA, 2011, p. 7). More recently, "in the first four months of 
2011, 24 Chinese provinces have suffered 'blackouts' ", which caused an economic loss of 
approximately "10.6 billion yuan" (EDWARDS, 2012, p. 22). 
In connection with the electricity supply disruption in China, we should mention the excessive 
dependence of Chinese industry on coal, from which approximately 79 percent of the country’s 
electricity is produced (BLOOMBERG NEWS, 2012). China is rich in coal, which represents 
“approximately 95 percent of the existing fossil fuels in the country" (JIANJUN TU & JOHNSON-
REISER, 2012, p. 2). 60 percent of coal reserves, including the coal with the highest quality - that 
is, with less sulfur and ash - are located in the north of the country (the main areas of coal mining 
are "Shanxi province, the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi") (EDWARDS, 
2012, p. 6). The proven coal reserves - 170 billion tons - existent in the country correspond to 19 
percent of the world total, ranking second largest in the world, after those of the USA. Since the 
Chinese economy opened up to the world, in 1978, “coal consumption has grown steadily as a 
result of electricity production and industrial use" (JIANJUN TU & JOHNSON-REISER, 2012, p. 
2). The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) demonstrates the key role that coal plays in the energy, 
economic and environmental future of China's twenty-first century. Although the country has vast 
reserves of coal, "the danger of coal mines, as well as the over-utilization of the railway 
infrastructure explains that it is easier for China to import coal, instead of exploring its own 
domestic reserves" (SEATTLE TIMES, 2011, § 43º). 
Coal will continue to be, in the case of the Middle Kingdom, "the main energy source for the 
next two decades", since the intensity of its use, makes it quite complex to replace" (CHOW, 2011). 
On the other hand, the growing energy needs of a China with a rapidly expanding economy “cannot 
be met neither by gas nor oil" (FONSECA, 2011). This expert compares the ability of producing 
electricity from coal in China to the production capacity of electricity in the UK, and admits, like 
Edward Chow, that China’s trend to use coal in the coming years should remain (FONSECA, 
2011). Currently, the country has "13 nuclear plants in operation, another 30 under construction and 
90 more in planning" (EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2013, §11º).  
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Although the 2005-2020 Program for the development of nuclear energy, released by the 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION (2011, p. 3) in 2007, has "drawn a 
target for the production capacity of the country of 40 million GW until 2020", the National Popular 
Congress decided to increase it to "80 million GW until 2020". However, the construction of the 
planned nuclear power plants tend to supply "only 4% of China's electricity needs until 2020, which 
is clearly very little for a country with huge energy needs" (FONSECA, 2011). That said, although 
coal is a highly polluting energy source, the expert argues that "it plays a key role in the design of 
energy security", because in the case of China, "it is an endogenous resource", i.e. "the country has 
very considerable coal reserves, and therefore will continue to explore it" (FONSECA, 2011). On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that "coal guarantees China its energy autonomy", or, at least 
"helps to minimize the extraordinary impact resulting from a threat to global flows of oil and gas" 
(FONSECA, 2011). 
In summary, the lack of electricity is a crucial factor in the context of China's energy 
insecurity. It is a source of cyclical uncertainty, to the extent that it is "regional, seasonal, and 
casual" and affects specific sectors (CHINA DAILY, 2011). In other words, it occurs mainly in the 
summer and in the traditional Lunar New Year (January/February depending on the lunar year), and 
especially at times of peak energy consumption (ZHANG JIAN, 2011). The most affected sectors of 
the industry are the ones that consume more energy, such as the case of "steel, coal-based chemical 
products, and aluminum smelters" (KOH GUI QING & WANG, 2011, p. 11). In terms of regions, 
the most affected are "the east coast, south and central China" (KOH GUI QING & WANG, 2011, 
p. 9). 
 
3. The Chinese perception of energy vulnerability 
There seems to be no clear definition of the concept of energy security in academic studies or in 
Chinese official documents (LABANDEIRA & MANZANO, 2012). The Chinese Experts use often 
the same definition summarised that their U.S. counterparts use – “adequate, affordable and reliable 
supplies - although, in general, do not specify what they mean by these terms" (DOWNS, 2006, p. 
13). 
The strategy used by the Chinese Government, with the aim of ensuring the energy security of 
the country, has been based in large part on the belief that oil is a strategic asset (CHINA’S 
ENERGY POLICY, 2012). In the 2012 White Paper, dedicated to the energy issue, the Chinese 
government announced that "the country is making special efforts to strengthen its capacity to 
provide energy, so as to improve its emergency energy reserves and to mitigate its dependence on 
external energy sources" (CHINA’S ENERGY POLICY, 2012). In China,  
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policy makers and state oil companies embarked on a multifaceted strategy aimed 
at improving the country's energy security through the acquisition of oil assets 
abroad, by diversifying suppliers, developing new policies to reduce demand, 
investing in energy substitutes, building strategic oil reserves and maximizing 
domestic production (BLUMENTAL, LIANG CHUA & AU 2009, p. 5).  
 
Beijing’s strategy with regard to energy security covers the acquisition of stakes in oil fields abroad, 
the military protection of vulnerable shipping lanes, and a 'race' for energy resources (SHAOGENG, 
2011). 
The Chinese government has encouraged oil exploration abroad, providing "low interest 
loans" to the Chinese state oil companies (LEE, 2012: 85) and sharing the responsibility of assisting 
the Chinese leadership so as to ensure a stable supply of oil, "NOCs have the task to acquire more 
assets in oil and gas, to diversify energy sources, and ensure the security of oil and gas pipelines, as 
well as supply contracts, in the long-term, with foreign producers” (SHAOFENG, 2011, p. 606).  
China’s growing dependence on external energy resources has led Beijing to make efforts in 
order to ensure greater control over energy supplies of oil and gas from abroad (JIANG & SINTON, 
2011). In practice, "there are three ways for a country to securitize its oil and gas supplies", namely, 
“by trade, through oil diplomacy and by force" (SHAOFENG, 2008, p. 79). 
Most studies on Chinese oil diplomacy either provide a static view of the motivations of 
China, gathering government and NOCs as if they were a single entity, or perceiving these as an 
extension of state policy (ELLINGS, 2006; TAYLOR, 2006; JAFFE & LEWIS, 2002). Therefore, 
such studies tend, implicitly or explicitly, to analyse the behavior of each NOC in international 
markets as corresponding ipsis verbis to the strategic behavior of Beijing, which, for experts like 
BO KONG (2010, p.154), does not correspond to reality, since "NOCs’ behavior is distinct from the 
Chinese Government’s behaviour". Some authors such as XIAOJIE XU (2007) and SIZHI GUO 
(2007) carried out an analysis of the relationship between Government and NOCs, in search of oil 
and gas abroad. However, their findings are not sufficient to reveal the motivations of NOCs, as 
well as those of the Chinese Government. 
The (Chinese) oil diplomacy can be defined as "activities abroad, with participation of the 
central Government, whose aim is to secure the external resources of oil and gas, or to promote 
business cooperation between states, around these resources" (SHAOFENG, 2008, p. 80). 
The concept of 'energy security' - "which has proved a practical concern, for about a century, 
and emerged as a distinct area of academic studies over the past decades" - has gained a certain 
expression within the energy debate that has gained a place in China since 1993, when the country 
became a net oil importer (CHERP & JEWELL, 2011, p. 1). Nevertheless, "it was mainly from 
2000, with the doubling of China's oil imports, that the concept of energy security has become a 
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relatively frequent topic of Chinese public discourse" (DOWNS, 2006, p.13). Analysing in more 
detail this discourse, it is clear that energy security concerns "to ensure the supply of energy 
resources in sufficient quantities for the protection of the main goals of the Chinese government, at 
prices that are not too high, nor too low, in order not to undermine these goals" (DOWNS, 2006, 
p.13). 
China sees energy security as the guarantee of obtaining the necessary energy resources for a 
sustainable - economic and social – development, seeking to ensure that the production and use of 
these resources do not harm the environment (QINHUA XU, 2007). On the other hand, in the 
Chinese view, energy security comprises  
the diversification of the sources of energy imports, the increasing of the share of 
oil and gas imports from Russia and Central Asia; enhancing investments in oil and 
gas infrastructure [...]; the creation of strategic oil reserves, controlled by the 
government; the adjustment of energy consumption and of the production structure; 
the development of nuclear energy; and the implementation of a regional energy 
system (DWIVEDI, 2006, p. 147).  
 
According to IONELA POP (2010, p. 202), "the [Chinese] strategy of international investments" is 
guided by the following features: 
 
Acquisition of participations in blocks of high exploration potential, proven 
reserves or asset owning corporations; government support through 
economic and diplomatic initiatives; integration, versatility and cooperation 
between the three major Chinese state oil companies; a low profile in 
investments; minimization of public disclosure of details of acquisition; 
modernization of naval forces aiming to protect sea lines; commitment to 
building oil and gas pipelines; promotion of regional and bilateral energy 
cooperation; participation in the Energy Charter Treaty. 
 
That said, Chinese leaders face oil, first as "a necessary resource to Chinese economic growth due 
to the lack of effective substitutes - including from the point of view of costs - for diesel, gasoline 
and aircraft fuel" (DOWNS, 2006, p.13). On the other hand, "oil is the basis of China's rise to 
superpower status" (DOWNS, 2006, p.13). The peaceful rise of China internationally is not directly 
related to Taiwan, but with the global competition for energy resources. It should be noted that the 
legitimacy of the mission and the existence of the Chinese Communist Party depends considerably 
on achieving the above-mentioned objectives. A former Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxin, said 
in an interview that "[o]ur diplomatic work should provide a vigorous support to efforts that aim to 
promote international energy cooperation" (Cit. by SHAOFENG, 2008, p. 81). 
Experience shows that “money does not necessarily buy the Chinese energy security", as 
shown, moreover, by the failure of the acquisition proposals of the Russian oil company Slavneft in 
2002, and the North American Unocal in 2005, by Chinese oil companies (DOWNS, 2006, p. 15). 
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To the impotence of Chinese financial power before the above-mentioned cases of economic 
nationalism, one must add "the perception in Beijing that the United States realizes, evermore, 
military power as a legitimate tool to win access over energy sources" (DOWNS, 2006, p. 15). 
Thus, China is aware that "the world oil market is vulnerable and unpredictable", since both 
producer and consumer states of energy resources strive to impose their rules and defend their 
interests (KREFT, 2006, p. 112). In this respect, "not willing to rely on these markets to meet its 
current and future energy needs, Beijing has pursued an economic nationalism in many parts of the 
world" (LEE, 2012, p. 75). 
There is, in practice, "a certain idea that while China is willing to pay the market price for oil, 
the world market will satisfy its energy needs" (DOWNS, 2006, p. 15). At worst, if a producer 
country decides not to sell more oil to China, then the Middle Kingdom can always turn to other 
States wishing to do so (YUSHI, 2006). 
In Beijing´s view, energy security has become "too important to be left to the mercy of the 
markets" (LIEBERTHAL & HERBERG, 2006, p. 13). Therefore, it will continue to be a driving 
force of China's foreign policy, and Beijing will tend to engage in a more extensive and intense 
way, with the producing states of energy resources, in a kind of win-win cooperation, "in which 
China provides a political and economic support to the governments of those countries in exchange 
for access to oil" (CARLSON & XIAO, 2011, p.96).  
In order to defend the strategic objectives of the Middle Kingdom, it is inevitable that Chinese 
leaders deem it necessary to influence the domestic policies of countries in which China has 
economic interests. In this regard, "China's status as an emerging economic superpower requires 
that it becomes a more muscular global actor in pursuit of its interests" (DORSEY, 2012, §15º). 
Ultimately, this may mean" [China] will take position on domestic disputes and conflicts 
worldwide, which have influence on the national security interests of China" (DORSEY, 2012, 
§15º). Likewise, "the country may need to maintain military bases in key regions, likely to ensure 
its energy supply and the security of its citizens abroad" (JAKARTA GLOBE, 2012, § 1º). China 
has been distancing itself from an "ultra conservative stance based on principles of sovereignty” 
(LAGERKVIST, 2012, § 19º). For these reasons, it will be increasingly difficult for the Middle 
Kingdom to keep its old principle of 'non-interference' (LAGERKVIST, 2012, § 22º). 
There is a certain recognition between Chinese foreign policy dignitaries - although through 
an unofficial discourse - that "the principle of non-interference is unsustainable and impractical" 
(JAKOBSON, 2008, p.128). With the Middle kingdom having to deal from now on with a "non-
traditional growing number of threats”, in countries in which it has commercial interests, it is 
evident that “Chinese policymakers have reflected about the best way to free China of what can be 
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considered as the 'non-interference trap'" (JAKOBSON, 2008, p.128). Moreover, Beijing is aware 
of the contradiction that arises when a rising power, which advocates building a 'harmonious world', 
as is the case of China, is perceived by the international community as not paying attention to 
international crises, such as genocide. 
The Chinese leaders tend to conceive the United States as "a country capable of manipulating 
the global energy markets in its favor, to the detriment of Chinese interests" (KANG SHENG, 2006, 
p. 80). Discussions on the need to contain the 'China threat' (in terms of energy security), by U.S. 
lawmakers and other Western officials, are a recurrent theme in Chinese political circles (ZHA 
DAOJIONG, 2006; LAI HONGYI, 2007). 
After having mentioned how the Chinese leaders conceive their countries energy security, it is 
nevertheless also relevant to point out, albeit in very general terms, how the rest of the world 
understands this issue (YERGIN, 2012). In this respect, "the sustainable development of Chinese 
economy is intrinsically linked with the world economy", thus "China's energy diplomacy has, 
therefore, a significant impact on the level of global energy security" (QINHUA XU, 2007, p.2). 
This raises a concern about how much more oil China (and India) will need to import the next two 
decades, and how quickly the world's oil reserves will be depleted if China's dependence on foreign 
oil remains (DOWNS, 2006). The increasing consumption of foreign oil, from China, has been 
perceived as responsible for the increase in oil prices and instability in the global spot market for oil 
(HOLMES, 2011; HONGTU ZHAO, 2005). As Barack Obama had already warned, on March 8, 
2012, "in the long-term, the main reason why oil prices will tend to rise is due to the growing 
demand in countries like China, India and Brazil" (ECONOMIC TIMES, 2012, § 2º). 
Secondly, China's energy needs have been the subject of increasing attention, since China is 
currently the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (THE WASHINGTON POST, 2013). The way 
Beijing deals with the challenges of conservation and energy efficiency, and diversification of 
energy supply sources, are issues of significant interest to the world, starting with neighboring 
countries (ZHONGXIANG ZHANG, 2013). In this respect, "China´s increasingly mercantilist 
strategy – of wanting to ensure control of oil and gas supplies, and transportation routes risks 
increasing tension and conflict in a region where the lack of institutions to manage conflicts is 
already a major problem" (HAYWARD, 2012, p. 30). To DAVID HAYWARD (2012, p. 30), 
"energy competition is starting to seriously aggravate rivalries between China and its neighbors". 
Thirdly, the many activities in which political leaders, diplomats and Chinese businessmen 
are involved in countries rich in energy resources have sparked concern in the West about the kind 
of behavior that can be expected from China, as Beijing expands its influence in the world 
(FRANCO, 2012; JACQUES, 2012). Western policymakers have sought to assess the extent to 
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which increasing economic, political and, in some cases, military Chinese influence in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and Middle East may be harmful towards to Western interests in these regions, 
because "if Chinese oil diplomacy strengthens ties with oil-producing states", it simultaneously 
"complicates relations with the oil-importing countries" (HONGYI LAI, 2007, p. 519). 
 
4. The Chinese response to the oil insecurity 
With the goal of reducing China's energy insecurity, Beijing has planned a series of measures 
designed to tackle the problems of lack of availability of oil, and limited reliability of oil supplies. 
In fact, as the CHINESE WHITE PAPER ON ENERGY (2012, p. 22) states, "China shall endeavor 
to maintain the stability of the international energy market and energy prices, protect international 
energy transportation routes, [...] and to cope with the global climate change”. In this regard, "the 
Chinese Government outlined a series of strategies to obtain oil and other energy resources, taking 
advantage of low prices in the global market" (ZHANG JIAN, 2011, p. 32). On the domestic front, 
the country has sought new oil reserves, susceptible to offset east China's reserves, mainly the 
Daqing oil field. After supplying China with approximately "50 million tons of oil annually" for 
over 27 years, Daqing was unable to maintain that pace, for the first time, in 2003 (PETROCHINA 
DAQING OIL FIELD, 2009, § 2º). To bridge the gap caused by the decline in the production of 
Daqing, the Middle Kingdom has gambled on two potentially resource-rich areas: the Tarim River 
basin (Xinjiang) and the Chinese offshore, which are two areas proven to be rich in oil and gas 
(U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2012). Under 12th  Five-Year Plan (2011-
2015), "China plans to invest 40 billion dollars in the development of offshore production, and more 
than double the production in the Bohai Bay and in the South China Sea" (SKOELD, 2012, § 3º). 
China is not known for frequent new oil discoveries, although it has been striving for better 
performance in that area. With the offshore oil exploration, the country added, in 2011, more than 
1.3 billion tons of oil to its reserves, an increase of 20 percent compared to 2010 (FORBES 
MAGAZINE, 2012). In turn, in 2012, new domestic oil discoveries were made in China, 
representing an increase of 13 percent over the previous year (THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
2013). About “85 percent of the oil production capacity of China is located onshore, especially in 
already developed fields; in recent years, the interior provinces of China, especially Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region and the central basin of Ordos, have also taken-up considerable attention" 
(EURASIA REVIEW, 2012, §17º). However, with respect to offshore production, "about 15 
percent of extracted oil comes from shallow reserves, especially in the Bohai Bay region, in the 
South China Sea, essentially the mouth of the Pearl River and to a lesser extent, from the East 
China Sea" (EURASIA REVIEW, 2012, §20º). In parallel with the investment on diversifying the 
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sources of external and domestic energy supply, "the Chinese government has consistently been 
encouraging the construction of strategic oil reserves" in order to "avoid a potential shock to the 
economy, caused by an interruption in oil supply" (IEA, 2012, p. 3). 
The construction of a national strategic oil reserve "is a relatively recent idea to China" (XU 
YI-CHONG, 2007, p.62). In 1998, the Planning Commission of the State Development identified 
some possible locations for storage and, a year later, four of them were suggested to the State 
Council. The proposal to build a national strategic petroleum reserve was confirmed in the 10th 
Five-Year Plan (2001-2005). 
Aiming to strengthen both vectors of reliability, supply and logistics of its oil imports, China 
relies mainly on the power available to the state and its oil companies (SHAOFENG, 2011). 
Understanding oil as a rare and strategic commodity, the Chinese government believes that the 
establishment of "close relationships with the energy producing countries" will provide China with 
a reliable access to oil sources (GAO YANG, 2012, p.14). Guided by this philosophy, Beijing has 
actively conducted an "energy diplomacy", based on establishing privileged relations with regions 
or oil exporting countries (GAO YANG, 2012, p.14). This energy diplomacy can take the form of 
"strategic partnerships", or "free trade agreements", or providing economic aid, such as "debt relief" 
(XIAOJUN LI, 2012, p.29). Moreover, it can also take the form of support towards infrastructure 
construction in countries rich in energy sources, similarly to what has happened in Africa, where 
Chinese workers have built railways in Nigeria, port facilities in Gabon, among others (HUSE & 
MUYAKWA, 2008; DUARTE, 2012). 
As the CHINESE GOVERNMENT's OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (2012, §8º) underlines, 
"China has been able to take advantage of the already established technology, and the relative low 
cost of labor, to help other developing countries build a series of infrastructure projects in terms of 
transport, communication, energy supply, among others". Public facilities constructed with support 
from China include mainly "public infrastructure, wells for water supply, conference centers , 
cultural venues and facilities for sporting, scientific, educational and medical purposes" (CHINESE 
GOVERNMENT's OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL, 2012, §9º). Besides the "economic infrastructure 
and public facilities", it is worth noting that "the Chinese foreign aid projects are oriented towards 
agriculture, industry, education and health care, focusing on the improvement of industrial and 
agricultural productivity in the recipient countries, establishing a solid foundation for their 
economic and social development" (CHINESE GOVERNMENT's OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL, 
2012, §3º). 
Chinese NOCs spent about "$15 billion on oil and gas acquisitions in 2009" and "more than 
26 billion dollars in 2010", in order to diversify their portfolio and profit from the valuation of 
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assets in the next decade (BARNES et al, 2012, §3º). Most investments made in 2010 were directed 
towards low-risk ventures in South and North America.  
Besides the objective of enhancing the reliability of supply sources, the securitisation of the 
energy resources’ transport is also on the top of Chinese policy-makers agendas (ZHANG JIAN, 
2011). In November 2003, former President Hu Jintao had stated that "certain major powers" were 
interested in controlling the [Malacca] Straits, and called for the adoption of "new strategies" to 
mitigate such "vulnerability" (PINEDA, 2012, § 2º). From then onwards the Chinese press would 
devote considerable attention to the so called 'Malacca Dilemma', with a newspaper declaring that 
"it is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will equally dominate the 
shipping energy routes to/from China" (PINEDA, 2012, § 2º). In 2010, an article in THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (2010, §17º) showed China’s concern as to whether the strait is "an area of 
American influence". Therefore, since 2003, in order to prevent the control of the strait by any 
external power, the Chinese government has strengthened the economic investment in the region, 
seeking, on the other hand, to maintain good relations both with countries that patrol the sea lanes 
from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca, as with the countries located in the Strait 
(LANTEIGNE, 2008). 
On top of Chinese security concerns regarding the Straits of Malacca, there is the danger of 
oil tankers risking collision, oil spill, kidnapping, piracy and terrorism. The Middle Kingdom seems 
also to be apprehensive as to whether the U.S. Navy, which acts as a force policing the strait, could 
choose to block it in case of war with Taiwan. In this sense, the "energy strategy of China" to deal 
with these threats is based, in part, in the "development of a broad portfolio of energy sources that 
do not depend excessively on oil from the Middle East, which must transit through the strait of 
Malacca, or by land pipelines from Central Asia which have to cross vulnerable states like 
Myanmar and Pakistan" (PINEDA, 2012, p. 3). Such pipelines are intended to meet three major 
objectives: firstly, "to bring oil and gas from neighboring countries to China via a direct route" 
(ANDREWS-SPEED, 2012, p.13). Secondly, "to reduce the Chinese dependence on oil imports 
originating from sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), and therefore their vulnerability to supply 
interruption" (ANDREWS-SPEED, 2012, p.13). Finally, "in the case of pipelines originating in 
Myanmar, to reduce dependence on sea lines of South and East Asia, particularly with regard to the 
Strait of Malacca, through which travels more than half of China's oil imports" (ANDREWS-
SPEED, 2012, p.13). 
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Final remarks 
As seen above, while rising power, China shows itself naturally apprehensive vis-à-vis its energy 
security, more specifically, with regard to the diversification of its energy sources. 
In the last decade, the three major Chinese state companies (CNPC, SINOPEC and CNOOC) 
have signed contracts for oil and liquefied natural gas supply, in the long term, in many countries of 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and Middle East, invested in important gas and oil pipelines projects, 
and acquired equity shareholders in oilfields abroad (the so-called ‘physical control over oil 
supplies). In this regard, the essential is to get technology and capital to explore oil abroad.  
In practice, the Government encourages Chinese state oil companies to carry out long-term 
contracts with the oil and natural gas-producing countries, or to get assets in the energy industry. 
China prefers the way of direct control over resources, rather than being subject to the provision of 
the international energy market, since in addition to avoid the instability of prices, the direct control 
of foreign oil and gas, it proves to be a safer strategy than obtaining resources from the international 
market. The Chinese Government has allowed its oil companies to compete, at the level of 
investments they perform in foreign markets, in order to promote their efficiency, although it 
establishes limits to that competition. However, Chinese companies do not have, for now, the 
technology and management capacity held by Western large oil companies. In fact, Chinese 
companies have not proved yet to be able to explore the most complex oil and gas deposits of the 
planet.  
The author believes that Chinese oil companies will not be subject to financial limitations, 
since the savings generated in China will make it possible to channel enough resources towards 
investment in strategic areas. 
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